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Abstract— The blockchain constitutes a technology-based, 
rather than social or regulation based, means to lower 
uncertainty about one another in order to exchange value. 
However, its use may very well also lead to increased complexity 
resulting from having to subsume work that displaced 
intermediary institutions had performed. We present our 
perspective that smart contracts may be used to mitigate this 
increased complexity. We further posit that smart contracts can 
be delineated according to complexity: Smart contracts that can 
be verified objectively without much uncertainty belong in an 
inter-organizational context; those that cannot be objectively 
verified belong in an intra-organizational context. We state that 
smart contracts that implement a formal (e.g. mathematical or 
simulation) model are especially beneficial for both contexts: 
They can be used to express and enforce inter-organizational 
agreements, and their basis in a common formalism may ensure 
effective evaluation and comparison between different intra-
organizational contracts. Finally, we present a case study of our 
perspective by describing Intellichain, which implements formal, 
agent-based simulation model as a smart contract to provide 
epidemiological decision support.  
Keywords—Blockchain, Smart Contracts, Agent-Based 
Modelling, Interoperability 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Many in the business world are hailing the blockchain as 
the next big technological innovation—placing it nearly at par 
with the Internet. Marc Andreesen, who as a co-writer of 
Mosaic and a co-founder of Netscape is truly a pioneer of the 
Web, said of blockchain: “when we’re sitting here in 20 years, 
we’ll be talking about [bitcoin and blockchain technology] the 
way we talk about the Internet today” [1]. The Tapscotts argue 
that inasmuch as double-entry bookkeeping enabled the rise of 
capitalism, this distributed “new digital ledger of economic 
transactions can be programmed to record virtually everything 
of value and importance to humankind: birth and death 
certificates, marriage licenses, deeds and titles of ownership, 
educational degrees, financial accounts, medical procedures, 
insurance claims, votes, provenance of food, and anything else 
that can be expressed in code” [2]. 
Within the Tapscotts’ effusive description is the concept 
that fundamentally a blockchain is used to implement a 
ledger—merely a ledger. At their onsets, the Internet was not 
merely a communications network, and the Web was not 
merely a document database. We state this not to minimize the 
possible impact of the blockchain, but rather to make the case 
that unlike the Internet and the Web, blockchain is 
conceptually simple enough to frame within a recognizable 
context. Warburg saliently provides such context: “There is a 
new, technological institution that will fundamentally change 
how we exchange value, and it's called the blockchain. Now, 
that's a pretty bold statement… remember that while 
blockchain technology is relatively new, it's also a continuation 
of a very human story, and the story is this. As humans, we 
find ways to lower uncertainty about one another so that we 
can exchange value” [3]. 
It is this context of technology to reduce uncertainty—the 
context within which the blockchain can be placed—that we 
explore further in this paper. 
II. UNCERTAINTY AND COMPLEXITY 
When we think philosophically about the blockchain and 
reducing uncertainty, we encounter the inherent trade-off that 
entails increased complexity. This follows from the Theory of 
Bounded Rationality by Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon [4] 
which states that the human mind’s processing capacity is 
small relative to the size of the problems requiring processing 
for an objective solution. Bounded rationality compels humans 
or processors to seek techniques to reduce information, task, 
and coordination complexity to solve problems. As humans 
and processors find it effective to act collectively to reduce 
these complexities, organizational structures form. 
However, as these structures form, they simultaneously and 
inevitably face increased uncertainty [5]. The trade-off for 
abstracting complexities to another organization—not having 
to know what information is required by them, how they 
perform tasks, and how they coordinate—and contracting to 
them as a form of value exchange is that your organization is 
uncertain of their own information, tasks, and coordination. For 
example, if your organization used to be responsible for 
manufacturing and customer service but you decide to 
outsource the servicing, the price for not having to deal with 
the complexities of customer service anymore is that you are 
more uncertain of how the outsourcer actually services your 
customers. The inverse then should also hold: As humans and 
processors break down organizational structures to reduce 
uncertainty, increased complexity would result. If your 
company decides to integrate customer service back to the 
organization, then the price of being more certain about how 
your customers are serviced is that you have to bear the 
complexities of providing customer service.  
Let’s consider a simple digital goods example. Say that 
your organization currently sells subscriptions for an online 
stock tips newsletter. You are unhappy with the flat fee that 
payment processors like Visa and Paypal take because you 
believe that it is too high a percentage of the monthly 
subscription fee. You decide to modify your current Website 
and exclusively only take orders in bitcoins. You are happy 
that the bitcoin network ensures that buyer payments are 
received without fraud and at higher margins; the network 
gives you even greater certainty of successful payment 
processing. Changing your business also forces you to become 
more certain about how you take orders. You are surprised 
however when you realize how much these intermediary 
institutions allowed you to abstract away the complex details of 
payment processing you now have to figure out—e.g. monthly 
billing and assuming credit risk. 
Bottom line:  Blockchain is a technological innovation that 
reduces uncertainty of value exchange but it may very well also 
lead to increased complexity resulting from having to subsume 
work that displaced intermediary institutions had performed.   
III. COMPLEXITY AND SMART CONTRACTS 
Let’s delve further into complexity using the bounded 
rationality model. According to Simon [4], an organization 
structures to decrease complexity in the following manner: an 
organization structures to accommodate division of labor to 
decrease information and task complexity; then, to product or 
functional orientation within the organization by structuring of 
near decomposable organizational units, which reduce task 
coordination complexity by enabling highly coupled 
coordinated tasks within the unit and lowly coupled tasks 
between units; and finally, to contracting to extra-
organizational near decomposable units—i.e. another 
organization. In contracting, “information complexity is 
reduced to a price; and task complexity, to contractual terms 
with a near decomposable unit, the contractor” [6]. 
If the contracting organization had been willing to contract 
a set of tasks to the contractor, those tasks must have been 
performed especially productively by the contractor. 
Presumably then, the evolution from division of labor to intra-
organizational near decomposable units with respect to those 
set of tasks must have occurred, and with particular 
effectiveness, within the contractor. So, if an organization 
determined to use the blockchain eliminates an intermediary 
contractor, then it must find alternative means to provide 
division of labor and near decomposable units’ capabilities 
nearly as effectively as the displaced contractor. The elegance 
of blockchain design is that one of its critical features, smart 
contracts, represents means to provide such division of labor 
and near decomposability; that is, smart contracts offer 
technological means to mitigate complexity in blockchain use. 
In the Industrial Age, division of labor delineated 
responsibilities between workers and machines. Smart 
contracts, as “applications [that execute on the Ethereum 
blockchain] that run exactly as programmed without any 
possibility of downtime, censorship, fraud or third party 
interference” [7] constitute the machine aspect of the 
blockchain-age division of labor. In fact, the promise of smart 
contracts is that the division of labor between workers and 
computer applications as practiced by a displaced contractor 
would be replaced exclusively by a workerless, reliable, and 
censor, fraud, and tamper proof “labor force” of smart 
contracts. Furthermore, smart contracts can be carefully 
engineered to exhibit characteristics of near decomposability; 
that is, smart contracts can be grouped into a near 
decomposable unit within which there is great task 
coordination, and less between. Ultimately, a system of smart 
contracts may function as the name implies: “pieces of 
software that represent a business arrangement and execute 
themselves automatically under pre-determined circumstances” 
[8]. 
There are the two possible configurations for a system of 
smart contracts: 
 A smart contracts system serves as a near decomposable 
unit within an organization. Its main responsibility would 
be to perform, govern, and coordinate those blockchain-
related tasks that are primarily internal to the organization. 
It would provide interface capabilities (like an API) so that 
inter-organizational tasks can be performed. An individual 
smart contract in this system may look very much like a 
traditional computer program in that it would be expressed 
procedurally. We posit this because as a unit within the 
overall organization this system ought to have visibility 
and access to various non-blockchain aspects of the 
organization’s data, business processes, systems, and 
workers. As a result, the contracts can orchestrate the 
details of how to perform tasks, and this would best be 
done through procedural programming. 
 A smart contract system may itself acts as a contractor. We 
envision several forms. One, it may be operated by the two 
parties of a bilateral contract to govern and enforce that 
contract. Two, it may be operated by a consortium 
comprising of parties in a multilateral contract. Or, three, it 
may be operated by a third-party who offers superior 
transparency, impartiality, lack of power-brokering, and 
efficiency than a traditional intermediary displaced via 
blockchain use. Regardless of the form, this contractor 
ought not to have intimate access to contracting 
organizations’ systems, especially their systems off of the 
blockchain. Instead, it should perform and coordinate tasks 
via these organizations’ interfaces (as mentioned above). 
These smart contracts should declare what tasks need to be 
performed by contracting organizations without 
necessarily specifying how. That is, these contracts should 
be programmed more declaratively, specifying contractual 
obligations and how they are to be enforced without 
detailing how contracting organizations are to meet these 
obligations.    
Bottom line: Smart contracts may be used to mitigate the 
increased complexity resulting from eliminating intermediaries 
through blockchain use. Bounded rationality states that 
organizations structure towards division of labor, near 
decomposition, and contracting to decrease complexity. Smart 
contracts represent programmatic means to efficiently apply 
these structures for value exchange. 
IV. UNCERTAINTY AND SMART CONTRACTS 
Let’s go back to the example of your newsletter company. 
Recall that you faced increased complexity for monthly billing 
and assuming credit risk. You realize that you either have to 
ask your customers every month to pay or rely upon them to 
remember to pay every month. Before, the payment processors 
took care of these details. More importantly, you realize that 
you have now assumed credit risk that the payment processors 
used to be responsible for. If you cancel a subscription because 
a customer has not paid, you run the risk that you are losing a 
loyal customer who happened to have insufficient funds on the 
due date or simply forgot. If you do not cancel and give more 
time to receive payment, you may be serving a free-loader who 
has no intention to pay. Before, the payment processor stepped 
in to assume credit risk. You did not have to cancel until the 
customers told you to because as long as they didn’t cancel the 
payment processors paid you. The matter of extracting 
payment then was between the processor and the customer, not 
you. Your customers now also assume a risk: what if you 
exploit automated unsupervised monthly billing by double-
billing or billing for extra months? You realize that your old 
payment processor had provided risk protection for not only 
you but also for your customers.  
Smart contracts give you means to deal with these risks 
without the payment processor. You can specify a set of smart 
contracts for your risk protection such as monthly price, 
subscription renewal period, penalty for late payment, and 
terms for dropping the customer. Other matters that can allay 
risk for the customer such as caps on payment, frequency of 
newsletters, as well as terms for dropping the newsletter 
service can also be specified as smart contracts.  All these 
matters can be verified objectively, except for the ones 
specifying dropping customers or the service, which require 
subjective verification.  It can be objectively specified and 
verified that renewal of the subscription occurs once a year and 
that a newsletter must be published every trading day morning 
at 7AM, but it is more subjective to specify and verify the 
standards on the quality of the newsletters to justify dropping 
the service or changing the terms of the service like monthly 
price. This dichotomy between objective and subjective smart 
contracts can be framed within a context of smart contracts and 
uncertainty. 
We have stated that smart contracts can be included within 
extra-organizational system of contracts or intra-organizational 
near decomposable system of contracts. The newsletter 
example illustrates that an importation factor in determining 
where a smart contract is included is the certainty with which it 
can be verified. Objective contracts should be included with the 
contractor; subjective contracts should be within the purview of 
the organization. 
So, maybe you specify a smart contract to verify that your 
newsletter is of high quality, and hence you believe you are 
warranted in asking for more for monthly subscriptions 
because you can demonstrate that the stock tips lead on average 
to greater investment income for your customers. In contrast, a 
particular customer may wish to cancel their subscription 
without penalty even though it is not yet the yearly renewal 
period because they believe the newsletter is of low quality, 
having experienced investment losses acting upon your tips. 
You and that customer may develop smart contracts specifying 
the quality of your newsletters that will yield contradicting 
conclusions.  
Bottom line: Smart contracts can be delineated according to 
uncertainty. Smart contracts that can be verified objectively 
without uncertainty belong in an extra-organizational system of 
smart contracts. This establishes agreements between two or 
more parties. Smart contracts that can only be verified 
subjectively with uncertainty belong in an intra-organizational 
system of smart contracts. This establishes models for one 
party. 
V. SMART CONTRACTS AS FORMAL MODELS 
Figure 1 compares agreement versus one-party smart 
contracts.
 
Fig. 1. Agreement vs. one-party Smart Contracts 
Let us now adopt some assumptions. Fundamentally, a 
system of smart contracts represents a model of a phenomenon 
represented using blockchain constructs. We further constrain 
these models to be formal. That is, a well-formed formal model 
yields a unique set of interpretations or inferences. Or 
minimally, a formal model yields a bounded set of 
interpretations or inferences. The key difference then between 
agreement and one-party smart contracts as models is that 
agreement contracts require multiple parties to “agree upon” a 
formal model, whereas one-party contracts can be developed 
by one party. In effect, an agreement contract models a 
phenomenon identically for all relevant parties, whereas two 
parties for whom a phenomenon is relevant may develop two 
one-party contracts of the same phenomenon in very different 
ways. Referring back to the newsletter service example, you 
and your customers may develop a multi-party agreement 
smart contract of terms of the service which can be interpreted 
(i.e. inferred, verified, etc.) unambiguously by all parties. At 
the same time, you may develop a one-party smart contract of 
your service quality where the interpretation of the contract is 
quite different and likely more flattering from the interpretation 
of your customer’s one-party smart contract of your service 
quality. 
An interesting question is whether the two one-party 
contracts of service quality ought to be visible to both parties. 
So, should the newsletter service see their customer’s less than 
flattering smart contract model of their own service quality? 
Should the customer see the service’s glowing smart contract 
model of service quality? To answer this, recall Warburg’s 
provocative point: “As humans, we find ways to lower 
uncertainty about one another so that we can exchange value” 
[3].  
Bottom line: The ability to evaluate different parties’ smart 
contract models of the same phenomenon increases 
transparency and lowers uncertainty of the value exchange. 
Moreover, it is desirable to make the model transparent yet 
hide some of the data required to interpret the model. Or in the 
parlance of the blockchain, the smart contract can be publicly 
viewable, but the data required for verification may or may not 
be open to all.  
In the next section, we discuss some works that develop 
formal models to underlie their blockchain smart contracts, and 
present a brief case study of the Intellichain formal modeling 
endeavor.     
VI. CASE STUDY 
Arguably, any endeavor that designs smart contracts 
assumes a model of a domain. However, in the current 
literature, most of these models are not formal. We define a 
formal model as a model expressed in a formal language such 
that a valid expression in that language entails an unambiguous 
interpretation and automatable inference. A valid smart 
contract expression encoded in say, Solidity, can be uniquely 
interpreted by a compiler or interpreter. However, the 
conceptual data and process models of that domain for which 
an entailment is implemented in Solidity is, more often than 
not, informal.  As an example, an informal model could be a 
set of business rules proprietary to a given company; a formal 
model would be a mathematical formula for calculating 
amounts exchanged in an interest rate swap. 
Exactly such a formula is implemented in the first proof-of-
concept for R3’s Corda [9]. In this implementation using the 
Corda blockchain, interest rate swap agreements between 
different banking partners are registered on the blockchain and 
smart contracts automatically execute terms of these 
agreements. However, specific terms of these agreements 
unnecessary for parties not involved in a swap to view are not 
made transparent to these parties. 
In the ModelChain framework [10], formal statistical 
predictive models are implemented as smart contracts. 
Specifically, each node in a permissioned healthcare 
blockchain would execute smart contracts to calculate and 
publish local statistical model estimation parameters to be used 
to calculate parameters for a global predictive model without 
making local patient data transparent. Furthermore, smart 
contracts could then execute the global model on the local data 
to make predictions about “local” patients, only making 
broadly visible worthwhile results or insights that still maintain 
the privacy of these patients. 
Similar to ModelChain in its applicability for public health 
is Intellichain, which can be used to assess public health 
intervention strategies through the use of a decision support 
framework with the core simulation component implemented 
as a smart contract.  
Epidemiological data inputs into the system can come from 
World Wide Web as well as mobile devices including 
smartphones and Internet of Things (IoT) devices. In the 
context of this proof-of-concept, all this data is anonymized, 
aggregated, and stored using a relatively simple mechanism 
within a smart contract, implemented using the Solidity 
programming language. This smart contract also implements 
the formal, well-known SIR (Susceptible, Infected, Recovered) 
agent-based simulation model [11] used in epidemiology to 
describe the spread of infectious disease. The SIR model can 
also be used to describe the spread of information in a network 
of individuals [12]. Analogous to ModelChain, estimates for 
model parameters are calculated via aggregating the collected 
data in order to execute the SIR model.  
The SIR model as with many Agent Based Models [13] 
features discrete models for locations, agents, disease 
compartments, and time [14][15]. Probability of disease 
transmission from an infected to susceptible agent is modelled 
as a parameter , which is used in Bernoulli trials to determine 
if the disease spreads from an infected individual to a 
susceptible individual in close contact. The Infectious period as 
well as  are drawn from uniform distribution, and their values 
are based on published estimates in literature [14][16]. The 
movement behavior of individuals is modeled as a Markov 
process based on imputed observations of transitions between 
locations. Each individual is parameterized with a number of 
contacts per time step, also based on observations or available 
data for that individual. For further implementation details 
please refer to https://github.com/professormarek/Intellichain 
and for deployment details and system diagram refer to [17]. 
  
Fig. 2. Number of currently infected individuals on each hour of a 
simulation. 
The simulation results can be interpreted using standard 
analytical tools such as graphs and charts. One such graph is 
Figure 2 which shows the number of currently infected 
individuals as a function of time during a simulation with 
particular initial conditions carried out on the test network.  
In addition to a traditional web-interface presenting 
aggregate graphs, charts, and statistics, the framework includes 
a Virtual Reality “Decision Support Table” implemented using 
the Google Daydream VR kit1 and Unity3D2. VR represents an 
intuitive and explicit means of visualizing data and simulation 
outcomes during the decision phase, and can be used for 
knowledge translation to convey the nature of simulation based 
modelling to stakeholders and the public during knowledge 
dissemination in the action phase. 
A demonstration of how VR can support visualizing and 
communicating simulation and decision support results has 
been published to the Google Play store for Daydream 
compatible devices. This app permits users to experience the 
simulation described by Figure 2, as carried out earlier on the 
test network. Both Figure 2 and the VR app communicate the 
important epidemiological principle of a super-spreader 
infecting several secondary cases early on in the outbreak. 
These cases in turn infect others later on. Once the app is 
launched, the user can look around in 3D space as well as 
navigate using the Daydream VR kit’s provided controller to 
view the simulation from a multitude of perspectives and 
speeds. The virtual decision table is visible in Figure 3 which is 
a screen capture of the VR app as a simulation is playing out. 
 
Fig. 3. Screen capture of decision table VR simulation demonstrating the 
images shown to each eye. 
Although at first glance this work appears to be an instance 
of using models for one party, in practice, there are potentially 
multiple stakeholders, each with their own domain specific 
model implementations. This suggests the potential for an 
Agreement Smart Contract in order to be able to compare 
results and outcomes between independently developed domain 
specific models. Figure 4 depicts one such scenario, in which 
an Agreement contract C is being used to compare the 
assessment made by two different Simulation contracts (A & 
B). The agreement contract needs to be able to inspect and 
reason whether the evidence provided by contract A is 
compatible with the evidence provided by contract B based on 
their respective formal models. This inspection is possible, 
though not guaranteed, if the modelling formalisms used for A 
is the same as in B. 
                                                          
1 https://vr.google.com/daydream/ 
2 https://unity3d.com/ 
  
Fig. 4. In a multi-stakeholder scenario an Agreement Contract, C, would 
have to inspect the underlying formal models of contracts A and B in order to 
determine whether the evidence provided by A and B is consistent. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
We have stated the following principles about the potential 
evolution of smart contracts vis-à-vis the blockchain. 
 The blockchain is a technological innovation that 
reduces uncertainty of value exchange but it may very 
well also lead to increased complexity resulting from 
having to subsume work that displaced intermediary 
institutions had performed. 
 Smart contracts may be used to mitigate the increased 
complexity resulting from eliminating intermediaries 
through blockchain use. Bounded rationality states 
that organizations structure towards division of labor, 
near decomposition, and contracting to decrease 
complexity. Smart contracts represent programmatic 
means to efficiently apply these structures for value 
exchange. 
 The ability to evaluate different parties’ smart contract 
models of the same phenomenon increases 
transparency and lowers uncertainty of the value 
exchange. Moreover, it is desirable to make the model 
transparent yet hide some of the data required to 
interpret the model. Or in the parlance of the 
blockchain, the smart contract can be publicly 
viewable, but the data required for verification may or 
may not be open to all. 
To that last point, this ability to evaluate, commonly 
interpret, and maintain transparency of different parties’ smart 
contracts is enhanced if the contracts implement formal 
models—whether they are mathematical, logical, or 
simulation-based. As a case study of this assertion, we detail 
Intellichain, which uses smart contracts to implement a formal, 
agent-based simulation model on the blockchain. As long as 
different parties adhere to a common modelling formalism, 
conclusions drawn from one party’s simulation can be 
evaluated “apples to apples” with those from another party. 
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